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Education as a practice in its own right (or sui generis practice) invokes
quite a different set of ethical considerations than does education
understood as a subordinate activity – i.e. prescribed and controlled in
its essentials by the current powers-that-be in a society. But the idea of
education as a vehicle for the ‘values’ of a particular group or party is so
commonplace, from history’s legacy as well as from ongoing waves of
educational reforms, as to appear a quite natural one. So much is this case
that the idea of education as a sui generis practice may seem a bit eccentric
at first sight. Some preliminary work is called for then to render intelligible
the claim that education is indeed a practice in its own right, and to
illustrate the original starting point this gives for an exploration of
educational ethics. In undertaking this preliminary work, central themes
from two major sources are explored and reviewed: Richard Peters’ well-
known study Ethics and education and MacIntyre’s After virtue. The
suggestive merits of both works for advancing a sui generis understanding
of education and its conduct are identified. But crucial occlusions are also
highlighted in the arguments of both authors, the recognition of which
might have enabled their thinking on educational matters to venture onto a
different plane. The kind of thinking that emerges from these investigations
as most promising for educational ethics is seen to differ in its key features
from what the various branches of academic philosophy have to offer by
way of ethical theory.
Keywords: sui generis practice; inherent purposes; justification;
practitioner; universality
Introduction
Richard Peters’ major work Ethics and education, published in 1966, counts as a
landmark in the historical development of the philosophy of education as a field of
study. It has stood the test of time less well, however, than other landmark studies in
the field, such as Dewey’s Democracy and education (Dewey 1916/1997), his
Experience and education (Dewey 1938/1997), or Freire’s (1972) more politically
overt Pedagogy of the oppressed. While works like Dewey and Freire’s continue to
provoke fresh research efforts and inform critical educational initiatives, Peters’
study seems to have lost most of the influence it enjoyed in the years following its
initial publication.1 This is regrettable, not least because the arena of educational
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ethics is populated by a more disparate range of stances now – even a bewildering
range of ‘incommensurable’ positions – than in the 1960s and 1970s. It is regrettable
also because some of the pathways of thought opened up by Peters, not least his
emphasis on universality in educational ethics, deserved to be more influential than
they turned out to be.
Among these many pathways, I want to highlight three related ones that should
remain central to any adequate consideration of ethics in education. The first of these
is Peters’ effort to demarcate a concept of education, not by reference to the
‘particular values’ of one or other individual or group, but by reference to public
criteria of justification. The second is his emphasis on education as an initiation
into ‘worthwhile activities’ and morally defensible forms of enquiry and experience.
The third is the attempt to provide a universalist basis for educational ethics in
democratic societies.
I am keen to argue that these three aspects of Peters’ thinking provide key
ingredients for a coherent and defensible ethics of education amid the most pluralist
of circumstances. But I also hasten to add that this prospect can be realised only if
these ingredients are explored in connection with an understanding of education as a
practice in its own right. The ‘preface’ mentioned in the title indicates a threefold
task, and an introductory historical reflection that places these tasks in a clear
context. The first of the three tasks is to highlight the merits of Peters’ efforts to
identify public criteria of justification, distinguishing educational actions from those
springing from particular interest groups, or from the powers of the currently
stronger party. The second task is to reveal how Peters’ strong commitment to an
academic conception of philosophy covers up again the fresh understanding of
educational ethics that his enquiry had begun to unveil. The third task is to move
beyond this occlusion in Peters’ work: to trace in outline the kind of enquiry called
for if an incisive and robust understanding of educational ethics is to be brought to
light. Such an enquiry – the heart of which lies beyond any prefatory exercise –
begins with an elucidation of education as a coherent practice in its own right.
It seeks to yield insights that might not only transform philosophical thinking on
educational ethics, but are themselves robust candidates for the commitments and
practices of practitioners.
The introductory reflection – which follows now in the first section of this article –
is concerned mainly with revealing the kind of taken-for-granted notions that keep
such insights largely invisible in customary thought and action in education. To fail to
appreciate the power of such unforced inheritances – that history ‘has us’ in more
far-reaching ways than ‘we have it’ – is to become delivered over to the most
illusory forms of self-assurance: a ‘bewitchment’ occasioned by our immersion in the
familiar. Such an appreciation is of particular consequence where a philosophical
understanding of educational practice and its conduct is concerned.
1. Ethics and education: an inherited ‘natural order’
The notion that education is essentially an undertaking to be controlled by some
superior powers or authorities is so widespread that it may seem part of the natural
order of things. And this hierarchical notion makes the contrasting notion of
education as a practice with its own inherent integrity and coherence seem a curious
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or even an eccentric one. Though discernable in the middle writings of Plato, and in
Aristotle’s Politics, a hierarchical conception of education as a major cultural force
came to prevail in Western civilisation only from the rise of the Roman Empire.2 For
many centuries thereafter, a politically powerful church came to define education
largely in terms of its own doctrines and interests.3 But not all hierarchical
conceptions of education were, or are, religious. Wars between church and state over
the control of schooling in the nineteenth century brought about in many Western
countries a dramatic weakening of a centuries-old dominion. But in few cases were
the reins passed to educational practitioners and their leaders. Depending on the
political and ideological complexion of the country in question, ascendant powers
sought to cultivate through schooling fresh allegiances to a range of newly prominent
‘isms’. These included nationalism, patriotism, utilitarianism and liberalism, among
others.
One might expect that the critical energies of the Enlightenment would have
accomplished an overthrow of a hierarchical order in education, or at least the
beginnings of its decline. Here, we can cite in particular the efforts of figures like
Rousseau (1712–1778) and Kant (1724–1804). Rousseau’s (1762/1993) declarations
against ‘civilised’ education in his E´mile offer the boldest challenges to the existing
educational order: ‘Our wisdom is slavish prejudice, our customs consist in control,
constraint, compulsion’ (10); ‘Children’s lies are entirely the work of their teachers’
(66). And the opening sentences of Kant’s noted essay of 1784, ‘What is
Enlightenment?’, sound a note scarcely less bold, if also more circumspect:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the
inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is
self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve
and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know]
‘Have courage to use your own understanding!’ – that is the motto of enlightenment.
(Kant 1784)
Yet despite such bold aspirations, the educational consequences of the
Enlightenment were notably less momentous than were its consequences for politics,
law, commerce and the organisation of industrial production. It is of course true that
Enlightenment thinking featured strongly in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s educational
reforms in early nineteenth century Prussia, especially in the founding of the
University of Berlin. Elements of Enlightenment thinking can also be found in
the educational writings of Pestalozzi (1746–1827) and Froebel (1782–1852). Yet the
strongest consequence of the Enlightenment for educational practice was not the
growth of new movements of learner-centred pedagogy or self-directing universities.
Rather, it was the progressive exchange of an ecclesiastical corps of superiors for
more secular kinds of superiors. Hopes that education might achieve recognition as a
distinct practice, with its own unique part to play in emergent democratic societies,
had to await the early twentieth century, when Dewey’s works achieved a period of
considerable influence in America and beyond. Even then, new developments did not
progress smoothly. The renewed attribution of libertarian motives to Dewey’s work
by conservative voices brought periodic trouble to his efforts as well as bringing
recurring constraints on his intellectual legacy.
The twentieth century witnessed further waves of conflict over the control and
direction of educational practice, as the powers of new regimes became consolidated.
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In Eastern Bloc countries, the dominant purposes schools were required to serve
were those of Soviet-style communism. In the democracies of the Western world,
battles were fought by different interest groups over the control of educational
systems as well as over the curriculum to be pursued and the teaching approaches to
be practised. In some Western countries, a notable devolution of powers to schools
themselves occurred during the late 1960s and 1970s. But this was followed, from the
late 1980s onwards, by a dramatic reversal. Successive waves of reform enabled the
assumption by governments of very extensive powers over the conduct of education.
Despite the fact that these reforms invariably sprang from democratically elected
governments, they were scarcely less demanding of compliance than were the
ecclesiastical controls on learning in the Middle Ages. The new reforms moreover
had two marked features in common with their medieval antecedents. First, they
accentuated the hierarchical distinction between the work to be done by educational
practitioners and the powers to be exercised by their approved superiors; approval
being now conferred by political rather than ecclesiastical authorities. Second, they
revealed a deep allegiance on the part of those authorities to doctrines that were
inhospitable to criticism or questioning.
A particularly significant feature shared by hierarchical outlooks in education is
the privileging of external rather than inherent sources for the ethical orientation of
educational action. Characteristically, such sources include political ideologies,
religious doctrines, or currently dominant economic and commercial priorities.
This picture is familiar, in more authoritarian or benign forms, from the history of
education, indeed down to the present. At the more authoritarian end of the
spectrum are striking examples like the extensive censorship of scholarship in
medieval centres of learning. A more recent – and more violent – example is the
educational policy of the Taliban government in Afghanistan during the 1990s.
Notable examples from the more benign end include the educational legacies of
figures like John Henry Newman (1801–1890) and Matthew Arnold (1822–1888).
Notwithstanding the urbane tone of Newman’s (1852/1976) classic The idea of a
university, he still insisted on ‘the dogmatic principle’ in his stance on education:
‘Christianity, and nothing short of it, must be made the element and principle of all
education . . . . Knowledge of all kinds must minister to Revealed Truth’.4 Arnold, for
his part, sought to win support for the idea of a culture of ‘perfection’, through his
advocacy of a national system of education modelled on the cultural values and
standards of the Anglican church. Examples from the recent waves of educational
reform embody a more secular credo, availing now of mercenary devices to recast the
ethical orientations of everyday teaching and learning.
In the case of these and other examples of hierarchical conceptions of education,
educational practice must minister, to use Newman’s telling word, to the demands of
superiors with decisive powers to enforce what they lay down. As suggested above,
this picture is so familiar as to be widely seen as part of the natural order of things in
education. What is less familiar however is that this ‘natural order’ also means that
the ethical significance of education itself is effectively obscured. More precisely, it
means that no credence is given to the possibility that education might be a form of
life capable of furnishing ethical orientations of its own. By contrast, to highlight just
such a possibility is not to say that religious, political, commercial or other influences
would be disregarded. Rather, it is to suggest that there are practices of teaching and
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learning that are educational before they are anything else. It is to point out that such
practices engage with religious, political, or other influences on a quite different set
of considerations than those that might prevail in a church, or a political arena, or
other public forum. In these distinctly educational considerations – to be explored
below – lie the inherent ethical orientations of education as a practice. And to suggest
that educational practice has such ethical orientations of its own is to maintain that it
is a practice in its own right. This remains the case moreover, though in somewhat
different ways, whether the venue where the practice is being carried out is a ‘state
school’, a ‘religious school’, an ‘independent school’, a ‘community school’ or
whatever.
A major philosophical work carrying a title such as Ethics and education might be
expected to pursue the articulation and justification of distinct ethical orientations
for education, and to provide grounds for distinguishing defensible educational
practices from questionable or indefensible ones. Peters’ study makes some notable
progress in this connection. As already suggested, however, just where his insights
approach the kinds of advances which enable thinking to break through onto a new
plane, he turns in a different direction. This, as I hope to show later, disappoints the
expectations it has quickened. It sacrifices an emergent originality of thought for an
embrace of academic conceptions of philosophy that are ill-suited to elucidating the
ethics of particular practices, not only education.
In the following section of this preparatory work, I want to investigate more
closely both the more promising and less promising furrows to be found in Peters’
approach. I hope to make clear the considerable debt the philosophy of education
owes to Peters’ researches. But I also want to identify shortcomings that point
towards the necessity of a different approach, the main outlines of which I will then
trace in the final section.
2. Ethics and education: the significance of R.S. Peters’ new departure
Peters’ Ethics and education includes many additional pertinent features to the three I
have identified. But as these three are particularly representative of his philosophical
approach, they provide a good core of issues for the kind of exploration that can be
undertaken within the scope of an essay such as this. Each of the three will be reviewed
here in turn: (a) Peters’ efforts to demarcate a concept of education linked to public
criteria of justification rather than to one or other particular set of values; (b) his
characterisation of education as initiation into worthwhile activities; and (c) his
elucidation of a universal basis for educational ethics.
(a) The necessity for public criteria of justification
In relation to this first feature, Peters (1966) calls attention to the philosophical
weakness of an educational thinking where ‘most writers dealing with ‘‘the aims of
education’’ persuasively parade the particular values they commend . . . but have little
to offer by way of justification’ (91). In seeking to identify more objective criteria, he
argues that the concept of ‘education’ is inherently normative. It would be a logical
contradiction, Peters writes, ‘to say that a man was educated but that he had in no
way changed for the better’ (25). A little later, he refines his description of the
Ethics and Education 89
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:3
2 0
9 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
inherently normative character of education by saying that ‘‘‘education’’ implies the
transmission of what is of ultimate value’ (29). If the ‘particular values’ of individuals
or groups are an unsatisfactory source for this ultimate value, the question arises:
where can a more satisfactory source, or sources, be found? For Peters, ‘arguments
derived from a solid foundation in ethical theory’ provide the most promising
sources (91). This turn to ethical theory for help becomes firstly a survey of the
resources supplied by a range of different theories, each of which he finds lacking in
some important respects. Peters’ critical survey reviews ‘naturalism’, ‘intuitionism’
and ‘emotivism’, before he switches to ‘a positive theory of justification’, based
largely on a modified Kantian, or universalist, approach. The elucidation and
application of this more positive theory is the centrepiece of Ethics and education,
and we will come back to review key aspects of it in dealing with the second and third
features of Peters’ approach to be explored here.
Remaining with the first feature, however, Peters’ turn to ethical theory makes
the explicit claim that ‘education raises no philosophical problems that are sui
generis’ (17). He explains this turn to theory by adding that education ‘is a field, like
politics, where several of the basic branches of philosophy have application’ (19). It is
worth noting in passing that Aristotle and countless others might take serious issue
with him on this characterisation of politics. But my own concern is to point out,
contra Peters, that education is precisely a sui generis undertaking, or more plainly,
a coherent practice in its own right. In fact Peters’ anticipatory glance towards the
‘several branches of philosophy’ makes his task more complicated than necessary
from the start. Ultimately it puts his enquiry on a less fertile path than would the
exploration of the sui generis theme.
Consider for a moment Peters’ claim that education raises no philosophical
problems that are sui generis. Of course, ethical issues such as justice, care and
equality arise in all walks of life. They are not specific to education. But they arise
differently in education than in nursing, or social work or clinical psychology.
A failure to appreciate this blinds one to what is specific to particular practices.
It deepens a rift between practice and theory and almost inevitably cultivates inflated
pretensions on the part of the latter. More critically, close attention to the work of
educational practitioners shows that Peters’ claim is a mistaken one. Teaching, like
other practices, engages its practitioners from the beginning in forms of relationships
involving ethical judgements that are specific to the practice. These relationships
include relationships of imaginative renewal with the subjects being taught;
relationships of guided learning with students as individuals and as groups;
relationships of professional co-operation with colleagues; relationships of trust
and confidence with parents and others. The bulk of the ethical problems that arise
for teachers spring from difficulties experienced in establishing and sustaining these
relationships. More subtly, they arise from difficulties experienced in understanding
these kinds of relationships clearly, or in combining the different kinds of
relationships productively and coherently in one’s actions as a practitioner. The
ultimate origins of the ethical difficulties are likely to lie in shortcomings in
understanding, in judgement and in interpersonal capability that constitute key
elements of the practitioner’s thinking and actions.
For instance, as a teacher I might quite rightly decry the determined resistance of
my students as obstructions of my efforts to teach them maths. But I might also fail
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to notice that my own understanding of mathematics – as essentially a matter of
mastering procedures and rules – might be a crucial contributory factor. Allied to
this might be a failure on my part to appreciate the importance of involving my
students in active ways in their own learning. I might also fail to see that this would
mean cultivating practices of learning that embody practical forms of justice, and the
progressive sharing by my students of more of the responsibility for their learning.
Even if I do appreciate this, I might not see the further practical consequences.
I might not realise that teaching and learning, far from being essentially a matter of
transmission and reception, constitute a joint event, experienced from a range of
different perspectives by those involved. I might not notice a necessity to develop
new kinds of learning relationships that disclose more imaginatively the topic being
studied and that combine this with manifestations of fair play in the learning
experiences themselves.
Emphasising the practitioner context as we have just done here calls attention to
the way ethical issues are rooted in the nature of the practice, and to the deepening of
ethical sensibility required of teachers in the development of their own practice. It
highlights the point that practitioners’ ethical judgements cannot afford to lose sight
of the context of practice itself: of the specific kinds of purposes, relationships and
predicaments that constitute that context. And what is said here of education
(specifically the deliberate conduct of defensible teaching and learning) can be said in
a parallel way of other practices, such as nursing, social work and medicine. That is
not to suggest that consulting different branches of philosophy, or different ethical
theories, is not important – an ethics of duty, an ethics of justice, an ethics of care, a
utilitarian ethics and so on. The fact remains however that many of the inspirations
provided by one theory are likely to be in some tension with those provided by
another, when ‘applied’ to the concerns of practice. One of the most frequent
examples of this is where considerations of justice conflict, usually in intricate ways,
with ones of care, or duty, or compassion in a teacher’s work. From the perspective
of education as a coherent practice, the weight to be given to any set of
considerations relative to others must be informed first by a perceptive command
of the particular educational purposes in question. The ‘application’ of theory may
confound as much as it illuminates then, unless the coherence of the practice itself –
its inherent purposes and benefits – are kept clearly to the fore. Peters is right to
emphasise the search for objective criteria. But where an enquiry into the ethics of
education is concerned, the focus from the start needs to be on an incisive
investigation of education as a distinct and purposeful practice. The most important
criteria to be sought, accordingly, are those that identify the sui generis nature of that
practice as a coherent and defensible one: as a practice in its own right. Even if that
investigation were to conclude that education was not a practice in its own right, the
arguments to support such a conclusion would at least have been rendered explicit
for scrutiny.
(b) Initiation into worthwhile activities
The second feature of Peters’ approach to be considered is his characterisation of
education as an initiation into worthwhile activities. Worthwhile activities, he argues,
are those that merit a place on a school curriculum. For Peters they include pursuits,
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such as poetry, science, history, art, carpentry, literature and philosophy. And they
exclude other pursuits, such as ‘bingo, bridge and billiards’, and games more
generally. His first kind of justification of this distinction is a ‘transcendental’ one, in
the Kantian sense of the term. In other words, he insists that some distinction of this
kind is a necessary presupposition to any informed exercise of choice; to any serious
attempt to answer the question ‘What ought I to do?’, or ‘Why do this rather than
that?’ (153–154). A further kind of justification of the ‘worthwhile activities’ idea is
closely related in Peters’ arguments to the role of education in cultivating higher-
order qualities of thought and judgement. In the earlier pages of the book, he uses
the term ‘cognitive perspective’ to refer to these (31). In Chapter 5, he refines this
further, and stresses the importance for the learner of systematic development of
‘conceptual schemes and forms of appraisal which transform everything else that he
does’ (160). Crucial to his argument here is that students learn to value such
conceptual schemes, even if their own initiation into them is sometimes difficult or
even boring. The student, in other words, learns to cultivate not only a proficiency in
the ‘forms of thought in question’, but also a ‘serious concern or passion for the
point of the activity’ (165). In two passing remarks a few pages apart, Peters
associates this kind of ‘concern or passion’ with the conviction of Socrates that ‘the
unexamined life is not worth living’ (163, 165). He does not, however, develop these
references into a further line of justification for education as an initiation into
worthwhile activities.
A notable feature of Peters’ case in elucidating and justifying worthwhile
activities is the restriction of his arguments to the kinds of procedures he identifies
with analytic philosophy. In the book’s Introduction, he describes these procedures
as ‘the disciplined demarcation of concepts, the patient explication of the grounds of
knowledge and of the presuppositions of different forms of discourse’ (15). Yet, his
‘worthwhile activities’ argument carries in the background some strong resonances of
another kind of philosophy, one that breaks through explicitly in the final chapter of
Ethics and education. There, Peters invokes the thought of Michael Oakeshott and
acknowledges that the ‘application’ of ethical principles requires more than
formal analytic procedures: that it can be accomplished effectively only where
people are brought up in an appropriate ‘tradition of behaviour’ (302). Had Peters
pressed this line of exploration further in the book as a whole, Ethics and education
would be a different book. Most importantly, it would be difficult for him to avoid a
further acknowledgement. This is the recognition that the exploration of an ethics
of education, or of medicine, or indeed of politics, can pursue its analytic procedures
not independently of tradition, but only within tradition. This insight, however
disconcerting initially, opens up some fertile and self-critical possibilities; but
ones which a strong adherence to one or other way of doing philosophy tends to
becloud – e.g. to analytic philosophy, ‘Continental’ philosophy, pragmatism,
Thomism, etc.
Where education as initiation into worthwhile activities is concerned, pursuing
such possibilities might grant a more central and more vibrant place than Peters’
approach allows to figures like Oakeshott, Socrates and others who feature
periodically in the margins of his arguments. This can be explored further in the
final part of the essay, but for now let us take up the third feature of Peters’
approach.
92 P. Hogan
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:3
2 0
9 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
(c) A universal basis for educational ethics
Peters’ efforts to provide a universal basis for educational ethics seeks its warrant by
identifying the presuppositions and conditions of possibility of forms of argumen-
tation that can claim universal validity on logical grounds. The application of this
semi-Kantian approach to a range of concepts central to education constitutes the
heart of Peters’ own ‘positive theory of justification’. The concepts he identifies as
key principles include justice, equality, consideration of the interests of others,
freedom and respect for persons.
The merits and limitations of this approach can be illustrated by examining how
it works in relation to Peters’ key principles. In relation to justice, for instance, Peters
writes: ‘the principle of justice is a presupposition of any attempt to justify conduct,
or to ask seriously the question ‘‘What Ought I to do?’’’ (124). This formal kind of
argument underscores the significance of the principle of justice for any actions that
claim defensibility. But it does not deal with the predispositions, which influence the
actual notions of justice in people’s minds and hearts. It has little to say to the
difficulties that arise where there are conflicting convictions, sincerely held by fellow
practitioners of any practice, about this very question of what ought to be done. In
relation to equality, Peters argues that the usual way of seeking to justify the concept,
namely asking for reasons for treating people alike, puts things the wrong way
round. He suggests that it is treating people differently that should require
justification, and offers the following principle: ‘no one shall be presumed, in
advance of particular cases being considered, to have claim to better treatment than
another’ (121). The grounds for putting things this way, Peters claims, lie in the
stance that ‘the general principle of no distinctions without differences is a
presupposition of practical discourse, or that it is presupposed in any attempt to
determine what ought to be done’ (121). One could, however, believe oneself to hold
faithfully to this principle in theory, while insisting that daily instances of one’s work
as a practitioner dictate a contrary course of action. For instance, as a school
principal I might call attention to pertinent differences – of ability, of aptitude, of
linguistic capability among students – that necessitate decisive forms of segregation
or discrimination in my school’s practices. In defence of my actions, I might call on
my long experience, or on long-established custom and practice, which dictates
that the differences in question require action that might seem discriminatory at
first sight.
Peters’ grounds for justification are similar for the other principles. In relation to
consideration of interests, he states: ‘consideration of the interests of others is a
presupposition of asking the question ‘‘Why do this rather than that?’’’ (171). In
relation to freedom, he offers: ‘For the principle of liberty. . . is also surely a general
presupposition of this form of discourse into which any rational being is initiated
when he laboriously learns to reason’ (181). And in relation to respect for persons he
suggests: ‘The procedure must therefore be to return to the situation of practical
reason and to show that respect for persons is a presupposition that any participant
in such a situation must accept’ (213).
That Peters himself is already aware of at least some of the limitations of this
kind of justification is evident from a comment he makes shortly before presenting
the main body of his own positive theory. There, he writes: ‘There is no rule for
determining which reasons are most relevant when the reasons fall under different
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fundamental principles, which conflict in a particular case. Judgement is required,
not a slide rule’ (128). The crucial point here however is that the kind of help
required from an ethics of education is, first and foremost, insight into the nature
and exercise of this very judgement. In the absence of such insight, what distinguishes
judgement from pre-judgement, or from one’s own unacknowledged preconceptions
or prejudices? In fact, Peters’ own investigation of the justification of his ethical
principles, and of the job to be done by each of them, serves to disclose the precise
limitations of the philosophical approach he has been employing. But just at the
point where such disclosure brings his enquiry to the threshold of a different arena,
Peters seems blind to where the enquiry is being beckoned. He offers instead an
almost homely piece of advice about the necessity for good judgement. More
crucially, he neglects to acknowledge that judgement and its exercise are invariably
predisposed by the hidden hand of history and its influence within human
experience.
3. Education as a distinctive practice
Each particular practice makes it own ethical demands, or more accurately, its own
range of demands. In medicine for instance, that range includes the diversity of issues
arising for a GP and the more specific but also more intricate issues faced by a
specialist in oncology, cardiology or gynaecology. Nursing has its own range of
ethical demands, sharing in some respects those of medicine; but it also has demands
particular to its own practice that are recognisably different from those of medicine.
Similarly, in education, the ethical demands faced by practitioners in the infant
school differ in important respects from those faced by their colleagues in a
secondary school, or in a university graduate school. Practitioners in one school
moreover may be confronted with more numerous and more challenging ethical
issues than their colleagues in a school located a few kilometres away in a different
kind of neighbourhood. Even within the same school, the kinds of issues arising
within one classroom might be more challenging from those arising in another.
These observations highlight two important points, both of which are promising
as research themes. First, it is by investigating the inherent purposes pursued by each
practice that the nature and scope of the ethical demands in question become
explicit. Second, the practice must be studied not only in relation to its purposes, but
also in relation to its actual conduct (its pursuit of these purposes), if the kinds of
ethical issues that arise are to be properly understood. It is this latter aspect of the
investigation that reveals how, and to what extent, different ethical principles might
conflict in the conduct of a particular practice. Clarity about the inherent purposes of
the practice is crucial, however, as this provides the light in which conflicting
principles might be weighed. In the absence of this clarity, the light shed by ethical
theory may at best disclose alternative courses of action: an ethics of duty
recommends one course, an ethics of care another, and so on. But, as Peters’
comment about ‘judgement’ recognises (but does not pursue), the capability needed
to weigh the alternatives and to decide wisely cannot come from ethical theory as he
describes it.
It is difficult to see how Peters’ researches could avoid following such promising
lines of investigation, had he taken the further step of identifying education as a
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practice in its own right, or even as a candidate for such a description. This step
would mean, firstly, that the ‘disciplined demarcation’ of the concept of ‘practice’
itself would feature centrally in Ethics and education, alongside Peters’ analysis of
concepts, such as ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and others. Secondly, the chief ethical
features of education as a human undertaking might then be reviewed in the light of
this analysis. The failure to take this further step however renders Peters’
investigations in Ethics and education curiously inconclusive, especially where
insights that might inform the defensible conduct of educational practice are
concerned.
Two and a half decades after the publication of Ethics and education, the
demarcation of the notion of practice was pursued as an exploratory theme by
MacIntyre (1981) in his book After virtue. MacIntyre’s characterisation of a practice
in that book is a complex one, so it is necessary to quote it in full. He identifies a
practice as:
any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended. (187)
Breaking down this intricate piece of prose, six elements can be identified in
MacIntyre’s characterisation: (1) a practice is a socially established, co-operative
activity that is both coherent and complex; (2) it has its own internal goods; (3) these
goods are realised through the work of practitioners who pursue standards of
excellence arising from recognition of the goods; (4) the achievement and
advancement of these standards help to define the practice itself; (5) human
powers to achieve such standards are cultivated by the practice; and (6) such
cultivation also contributes to a richer understanding of the practice. MacIntyre
devotes a number of pages to elaborating these elements. Further distinctive features
of practices and their conduct are made explicit in that elaboration. These include:
that every practice has a history of one kind or another; that every practice
establishes relationships influenced by the standards its participants pursue; that in
order to advance the internal goods of the practice, these relationships require the
exercise of certain virtues, such as courage, truthfulness and trust; that practices
require institutions to sustain them; that practices can become pursued for external
rewards as well as for their internal goods; that to participate properly in a practice is
to recognise its internal goods and the standards necessary to achieve these goods
(188).
The features identified by MacIntyre help to distinguish practices from human
activities that would not count as practices. He gives some examples himself: planting
turnips is not a practice but farming is; bricklaying is not a practice but architecture
is; and throwing a football skilfully is not a practice, but the game of football is.
Other examples of practices he includes are fields of study, such as physics, chemistry
and biology, and artistic pursuits, such as music and painting (187).
MacIntyre’s analysis of practice explores central aspects of the landscape from
which Peters’ Ethics and education turned aside. In doing so, it provides a potentially
fruitful path for identifying the distinctiveness of education as a practice, and of its
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inherent ethical orientations; or so it would seem. Yet, it is just here that MacIntyre
himself turns aside. In a notable interview with Joseph Dunne (MacIntyre and
Dunne 2004), who suggested to him the possibilities of the path just mentioned,
MacIntyre responded by declaring that ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of
skills and habits turned to a variety of practices’ (5). Initially, one might think that
MacIntyre might just have meant: ‘teaching is not a practice but education is’, like
his earlier statements about bricklaying, turnip planting and ball throwing. But
MacIntyre goes on to say that ‘teaching is never more than a means’ and that
‘teaching does not have its own goods’. He adds that ‘the life of a teacher of
mathematics, whose goods are the good of mathematics, is one thing; a life of a
teacher of music whose goods are the goods of music is another’ (8).
To deal fully with MacIntyre’s claims here would take more than a few pages.5
The kernel of his claim that teaching is not a practice is contained however in the two
statements ‘teaching is never more than a means’ and ‘teaching does not have its own
goods’. Yet there is something arcane, even a philosophical aloofness, in MacIntyre’s
analysis of notion of the ‘internal goods’ of a practice. Had he explored the notion of
‘internal goods’ further, by way of a few examples from experience, it would be
necessary to acknowledge that such goods can be understood in contrasting ways.6
For instance, they can be viewed as already-established accomplishments, to be
valued essentially for the self-contained satisfactions they yield to competent
participants and spectators (e.g. the ‘goods’ of chess or of cricket). But ‘goods’ can
also be viewed as valued human goals that have yet to be brought about. Here, they
direct attention to purposes that are ever to be clarified and justified, pursued and
renewed. Examples here include the promotion of independent living in their own
homes for people with chronic illnesses, the search for better diagnosis and treatment
of cancers, the cultivation of a range of human dispositions through teaching and
learning. It is worth noting in passing that ‘internal goods’ of the already-established
kind and of the goal-oriented kind can themselves become mingled with ‘external
goods’. In the case of the first kind, one might play cricket not only for its inherent
satisfactions, but also for external rewards, such as social status and prestige. In the
case of the second, one might pursue a course of studies not only for inherent
benefits, such as fluency in a particular subject, or the betterment of one’s powers of
understanding, analysis and discernment. One could also have an eye to highly paid
career opportunities that the course of studies might bring within one’s reach.
MacIntyre leaves ‘internal goods’ of the second (goal-oriented) kind largely
unexplored: ‘goods’ that can more plainly be called the inherent purposes of practices,
such as nursing, medicine, social work and education. This neglect, and the related
preoccupation with more academic and aesthetic ‘goods’, diminishes MacIntyre’s
awareness of practices that are primarily oriented to promoting one or more aspects of
human flourishing.7 It is as a practice in this latter domain that education can be called
a practice in its own right. Accordingly, its inherent purposes are not only subject
specific (pursuing the goods of history, the goods of physics and so on). They also
include goals that are generic to the developmental nature of practitioners’ work:
for example, the cultivation of qualities, such as method in enquiry, discernment in
analysis, even-handedness in weighing evidence and attentiveness in listening to
contrasting perspectives to one’s own. The identification of such goals brings to the
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centre of philosophical investigation the communal forms of enquiry that Peters’
references to figures like Socrates and Oakeshott touch on more remotely.
The ethical orientations for practitioners that emerge from the inherent purposes
of education suggest moreover a range of practical virtues, ones that are associated
with the promotion of defensible and promising forms of teaching and learning. Such
orientations themselves disclose insights, capabilities and communicative actions that
have a primary claim on the commitments of teachers, quite apart from teachers’
personal convictions in matters political or religious. In particular cultural settings,
however, this point and its significance might be obscured by the inherited legacy of
the practice; beclouded, that is, by the institutionalised attitudes and routines that
prevail in the conduct of the practice in that cultural setting. Purposes which are
those of a particular institution (e.g. a church, a political party, a commercial body)
might have become so dominant that they are widely taken to be the inherent
purposes of the practice itself, even by the bulk of practitioners. Thus we see how
easily the kind of ‘natural order’ reviewed earlier insinuates itself and extends
its realm.
Conclusion
This ‘preface’ prepares the way for a more substantial investigation of the ethical
orientations of education as a practice in its own right. It identifies some mistakes to
be avoided and a number of key points to be borne in mind if such larger
investigation is to be profitable; if it is to yield coherent and convincing illuminations
for the conduct of teaching and learning. Five such key points can be summarised by
way of conclusion. First, this more substantial investigation involves identifying the
nature and scope of the inherent purposes of the practice. Second, related to this is
the elucidation of a recognisable family of virtues that describe exemplary instances
of the practice. Third, this in turn involves an exploration of the kinds of
relationships through which these virtues, and their educational fruits, are nourished
(as distinct from deformed). Fourth, another important feature of the larger
investigation is the disclosure of educationally productive pathways amid the diverse
influences that come into play when teaching and learning are experienced, not as a
delivery or transmission, but as a joint venture. Finally, but not least, the more
substantial investigation involves exploring how educational practice might turn to
its advantage the inescapable fact that it is embedded in one or more traditions.
Notes
1. On this point, see Warnick (2007).
2. From a historical point of view, it would be more accurate to associate the dominant
Western conceptions of education less with the actual writings of Plato and Aristotle than
with their effective legacy: the neo-Platonism of Augustine and other Latin Church
Fathers in the fourth to fifth centuries, and later the neo-Aristotelianism of Thomas
Aquinas in thirteenth century. This dominant conception received its most decisive early
impetus from the fusion of the Roman Empire’s interests with institutionalised forms of
Christianity during the reign of Emperor Theodosius I (378–395). The rise of a particular
kind of Christian theology, associated with saints Ambrose (338–397), Jerome (347–420),
and especially Augustine (354–430), was also central in this event.
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3. See Boyd and King (1972, 99).
4. This passage from Newman’s third of seven ‘Catholicus’ letters to The Times newspaper
in 1841 is quoted by Ker (1998, 200).
5. A number of essays in MacIntyre and Dunne (2004) review in detail this controversial
claim of MacIntyre’s.
6. This criticism of MacIntyre’s failure to make necessary distinctions in his account of
practice is pursued byMiller (1994, 250). Important consequences of these failures for how
university education is understood and practised are explored by Smith (2004, 74–87).
7. The neglect is partially compensated for in MacIntyre’s later book Dependent rational
animals (MacIntyre 1999, 77, 89), where he specifically mentions ‘the virtues of caring and
teaching’ that enable any person to become an ‘independent practical reasoner’. He also
says: ‘All teaching requires some degree of care for the student qua student, as well as for
the subject matter of the teaching’. His comments in such instances presuppose that
teaching has indeed ‘its own goods’, though MacIntyre does not pursue the implications
of this.
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